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with an income tax. The top rate is 6.8% in New
York, 5.6% in Massachusetts, and about 10% in
Rhode Island.
Second, since the state income tax is deductible
on the federal return, this lowers the bite from
4.5% to more like 2.7% for those in the top feder-
al bracket. The deductibility of state income taxes
allows Connecticut residents to export hundreds of
millions of dollars of the state income tax burden
to the rest of the country. 
Third, before our broad-based income tax was
introduced, most high rollers were already paying
the tax on interest, dividends, and capital gains at
rates that reached 14%, the highest in the nation
by far.  Some got a tax cut when the broad-based
income tax was adopted.  
And fourth, many filers who worked in border-
ing states paid less when the income tax was
introduced. Here’s why. A Greenwich economist
working in New York pays income taxes to New
York on her earnings there, then gets a credit for
that payment against her Connecticut return, thus
erasing her Connecticut liability on that income.
She still pays Connecticut taxes on other income—
but at a 4.5% rate instead of 14%. 
This last point works to Connecticut’s advantage
for those working in Connecticut but living else-
where. Before Connecticut’s income tax, this group
paid income taxes to their state of residence
(except for New Hampshire). They now pay taxes
here and get credit on their home state return,
with no change in their overall burden.
Connecticut collects over $300 million a year from
non-residents or part-year residents. Most of this
money was simply paid to other states when
Connecticut had no broad-based income tax.
In light of the above, the General Assembly may
be tempted to close the projected budget gaps by
simply raising the top rate on high-income filers.
But that’s dicey. When Connecticut adopted a
broad-based income tax, it lost its unique status,
especially with chief executives who get to choose
where to locate corporate facilities. We minimized
the damage by keeping the tax rate relatively low,
but it wouldn’t take much to lose that small
advantage. For example, just a one-percentage
point increase would virtually match the rate in
Massachusetts.  
And the new tax has broader implications for
the economy. For example, it may have stalled our
economic recovery during the 1990s and slowed
our population growth to only 3.6%, fourth slow-
est nationally. Population in the seven states with-
out an income tax grew an average of 22.9%
between 1990 and 2000, double the 11.4% average
for states with an income tax.   We should be care-
ful about inferring causality from this, since differ-
ences in demographics, living costs, climate, and
the like also shape population patterns. Still, we
should think twice before raising the top income
tax rate.
The author is Editor Emeritus of The Connecticut Economy
and Professor Emeritus at UConn. The sixth 
edition of his textbook, Economics: A Contemporary
Introduction, will be published this spring.
By Art Wright
The economy is once again in recession, and gold has again turned to dross in
the State’s budget.  The surpluses that funded tax rebates just a short time ago
have morphed into deficits that seem to swell with each passing week.  Like clock-
work, deficit politicking is in full swing.  Republicans and Democrats disagree over
how big the deficit will be, and also over how to cope with it—cut spending, raise
taxes, issue new debt, or dip into State budget reserves?
The Capitol sausage machine is working as usual, but the problems seem less
severe than the last time.  Then, State politicos exhausted budget reserves in fis-
cal years 1988-1991 before biting the bullet and passing the current income tax,
which took effect in September 1991.  (See William A. McEachern’s article on
the facing page.)  This time, the recession’s effects seem to have been milder,
and going into the downturn the State’s Rainy Day Fund was full at its target 5%
of spending.  Recent State surpluses were used to fund capital projects and one-
time outlays as well as to retire debt.
The Governor and the General Assembly deserve pretty good marks for their
husbandry of Connecticut’s fiscal resources over the past decade.  Our elected
officials have largely resisted the temptation to match strong revenue growth
with new spending.  How to use surpluses, the Rainy Day Fund, and new debt
—to stabilize spending, fund capital projects, or start new programs—is still the
stuff of political debate.  But that is inevitable, and right.
Longer term, though, some see the pink if not rosy budget picture fading if
certain structural problems in state finances prove tougher than now anticipated.
Dimensions of the Current Deficit
The general-fund budget for FY 2002 that the General Assembly passed in
June 2001 was in balance at $11.9 billion in revenues and appropriations.  (The
total budget also includes more than a billion dollars in “special appropriations,”
80% of it “Special Transportation Funds.”)  By the end of last year, a gap of
more than $550 million had opened up in that budget.  Several rounds of spend-
ing cuts and other maneuvers beginning in September brought the projected
deficit down to $165 million as of this writing.  For comparison, the Rainy Day
Fund stood at about $600 million in July 2001, according to estimates in
Governor Rowland’s proposed FY 2002 budget, completed in February 2001.  
Budget pains in the vicinity of 4-5 percent of originally targeted appropriations
pale by comparison with the woes of some other states.  A December 2001
report by the respected Fiscal Studies Program of the Rockefeller Institute of
Government at SUNY-Albany put Connecticut near the bottom of the heap of
troubles.  Measuring projected FY 2002 budget shortfalls as a percentage of FY
2000 expenditures, the study found Alaska (with a double whammy from lower
oil prices on top of the recession) at the top at 28.3%, trailed by Minnesota at
17.0%, and Arizona at 11.2%.  In New England, Maine was in Connecticut’s
league, while Rhode Island, Vermont, and Massachusetts were in the next higher
tier.  (New Hampshire was not part of the analysis.)
Grounds for optimism?  Smugness may be premature, given (a) the trend in
the State’s deficit since last summer; (b) the underestimate by the Rockefeller
Institute of the size of Connecticut’s FY 2002 shortfall ($96 million); and (c)
warnings (e.g., by Economy.com, the regional/national forecasters) that New
England, late to the recession, may not have seen the worst of it yet (Wall Street
Journal, “Regional Report,” January 23, 2002, p. B12).
The usual suspects underlie Connecticut’s current budget difficulties.  The
economic slowdown, prudently assumed in advance for the FY 2002 budget,
turned into a slump.  New appropriations, mostly recession-driven, now total
$74.4 million.  And tax revenue growth that was expected to tail off, instead
went south: at mid-fiscal-year, the Office of Policy and Management (OPM) is
projecting that personal income tax revenues will drop by more than $90 million
(nearly 2%) from FY 2001, and sales tax collections by more than $35 million
(1.1%).  Big drops in projected corporation and inheritance-and-estate taxes
(respectively, $119.3 and $92.8 million) were largely anticipated, reflecting
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phased-in cuts or bearish stock markets as well as
the recession.  Interestingly, tax refunds are expect-
ed to jump by $47 million (6.4%) over the FY 2001
level.  Real estate conveyance tax receipts are hold-
ing their own, reflecting the anomalously strong
real estate market, and “Indian gaming pay-
ments”—the State’s 25% skim from the casinos’
“win” on slot machines—are expected to leap by
14.3% to $380 million.  Are folks avoiding airline
flights and staying closer to home for R&R since
9/11?
So Is It a “Rainy Day”?
Arguably, Governor Rowland and the General
Assembly have already donned galoshes and rain-
coats and put up their bumbershoots, with the
$386.2 million in spending cuts and surplus trans-
fers already enacted.  Thus, it is
raining outside, and so
Connecticut should dip
into its $600 million
Rainy Day Fund to
cover the remaining
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(whoever they may be)
will act as responsibly
as those of the past
decade and restore
the Rainy Day Fund to
its full 5% of appropriations, once the sun comes
out again.  That first assumption is suspect, as
indicated earlier; hence, our leaders may well have
to consider tax increases (e.g., on cigarettes, as
Governor Rowland has proposed), further spending
cuts, dipping deeper into the Rainy Day Fund, or
issuing new debt—that is, simply living with a
short-term deficit and borrowing to meet the bills.
The more the State relies on budget reserves or
borrowing to weather the present storm, of course,
the sterner the test facing future officials.
Beyond the Current Deficit 
Sound fiscal policy is a strategic, not a tactical
matter.  Bodies politic seldom achieve sound fiscal
policy, because (contrary to conventional wisdom
and civics-textbook teachings) elected public offi-
cials have time horizons no longer than the next
election and often less than that.  Connecticut has
been fortunate in this regard over the past decade
or so, but our political process faces some chal-
lenges that demand strategic, not tactical thinking.
One such challenge is the general balance
between state and local tax bases, and the particu-
lar issue of relative tax burdens between (state)
income and sales taxes and (local) property taxes.
Taxpayer pressures have led many states, including
Connecticut, to curb spending growth, but that
may shift responsibility for some social services,
especially education, to localities.  One way to
curb spending growth is to cut state taxes, and
Connecticut has been whittling away at its person-
al income tax, at the low end (with “3% income”
and property tax credits), since 1996.  Even so, in
Connecticut general revenues from state sources as
a percent of personal income rose during the
1990s, putting our figure well above the U.S. aver-
age (see page 4).  The corresponding figure for
local revenues did edge up, by only 0.1 point over
the decade, but Connecticut was still well below
the national average in 1999.  Thus, resistance to
introducing user fees and other local non-property
taxes, combined with reliable state transfers to
localities, has prevented a shift of tax burdens from
the state to the local level so far. 
Three other tax challenges to state governments
were the subject of a recent article by Robert
Tannenwald, an economist at the Boston Federal
Reserve Bank, in its quarterly, The New England
Economic Review (2001, number 4).  Tannenwald
warns of the impending “obsolescence” of state
revenue systems, because of three often interrelat-
ed trends: (1) the shift from goods to services in
the nation’s mix of output; (2) the proliferation of
e-commerce; and (3) the intensification of inter-
jurisdictional tax competition.  In all three cases,
collaboration among the states may be essential to
successfully meeting the challenges.
The growing economic dominance of services
has states performing acrobatics to keep their sales
taxes broad-based—but at the risk of driving eco-
nomic activity out-of-state and in the face of oppo-
sition to the double taxation of personal services.
States that rely heavily on sales taxes still face an
uphill battle in use-tax compliance on Internet pur-
chases, or in persuading Congress to levy a nation-
al e-commerce sales tax and distribute the pro-
ceeds among the states.  (The latter would shift the
compliance problem to the Federal government.)
Prudence may dictate (e.g.) shaving another point
off the 6% sales tax, to limit the State’s exposure.
The “bidding crescendo” (in Alice Rivlin’s
phrase) in state efforts to attract new investments
with tax breaks has reached a point many view as
a lose-lose situation.  This writer must confess to
back-of-the-envelope skepticism that many of the
State tax deals announced to lure this plant or that
headquarters to Connecticut really benefit the
state’s economy.  Oddly, such deals are hardest to
justify during the down-revenue phase of a reces-
sion—precisely when new investments could do
the most good.  Long term, the level and structure
of taxes is more important to attracting new invest-
ment than one-off special deals.